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THE PRAYER AMENDMENT: A JUSTIFICATION
Charles E. Rice*
It is customary for each house of Congress to open its
daily sessions with prayer delivered by its Chaplain. One
might conclude that if the lawmakers of the nation are en-
titled to ask for divine blessing upon their work, so are the
rest of us, including school children. Not so. For the Supreme
Court of the United States has drawn the line. Legislators
may pray, so far at least, but school children may not. Thus
it was that the courts intervened to prevent the holding of
"a period for the free exercise of religion" in the Netcong,
New Jersey, public high school.1 The period was conducted
as follows:
At 7:55 a.m. in the Netcong High School gymnasium, immediately
prior to the formal opening of school, students who wish to join in
the exercise either sit or stand in the bleachers. A student volunteer
reader, assigned by the principal on a first come, first serve basis,
then comes forward and reads the "remarks" (so described by de-
fendants) of the chaplain from the Congressional Record, giving the
date, volume, number and body whose proceedings are being read
... The volunteer reader is free to add remarks concerning such
subjects as love of neighbor, brotherhood and civic responsibility.
At the conclusion of the reading the students are asked to meditate
for a short period of time either on the material that has been read
or upon anything else they desire.2
The court held that the Congressional chaplain's "re-
marks" were really prayers and that therefore the program
violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment.
Further, the court held that its prohibition of the program
does not violate the free exercise of religion of students who
desire to participate.
In 1965, a New York public school principal forbade
kindergarten children to recite, on their own initiative, a
simple grace before their morning cookies and milk. The grace
was:
"God is Great, God is Good, and we thank Him for our Food.
Amen I"
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame University. A.B. 1953, Holy Cross; LL.B.
1956, Boston College; J.S.D. 1962, New York University.
1. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Educ. of Netcong, 108 N.J. Super. 564,
262 A. 2d 21, affd, 57 N.J. 172, 270 A. 2d 412 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1013 (1971).
2. Id. at 568-569, 262 A. 2d at 23-24.
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The afternoon kindergartners recited a different prayer:
"Thank you for the World so Sweet,
Thank you for the Food we Eat,
Thank you for the Birds that Sing-
Thank you, God, for everything."
When the parents of these children brought suit to com-
pel the principal to allow them to say grace, the federal court
upheld the principal. 3 A couple of years later a public kinder-
garten teacher in Illinois attempted to comply with the Steiv,
decision by leaving the word, "God" out of the grace. The
grace therefore read, "Thank you for the world so sweet,
thank you for the food we eat, thank you for the birds that
sing-thank you for everything." The federal court forbade
her to have her pupils recite the amended grace before the
snacks, because everyone knows that "you" means God and
the intent is to offer thanks to God, which is forbidden in
public schools.4
The Supreme Court's rulings barring prayer in public
schools have been consistently opposed, if public opinion polls
are a reliable indicator, by a clear majority of the American
people.8 And there has been an increasing disregard for the
rulings by local school authorities and parents.6
The prayer decisions were handed down in 1962 and 1963,
but it was not until 1971 that a constitutional amendment to
rectify them was voted on by the House of Representatives.
On November 8, 1971, the House voted 240 to 162 to approve
a constitutional amendment to allow prayers in public schools
and other public buildings. 7 Since an amendment to the Con-
stitution requires the approval of two-thirds of each house of
Congress, the vote fell 28 votes short of the required margin
and the amendment was therefore defeated.
8
As originally proposed by Representative Chalmers P.
Wylie (R-Ohio), the prayer amendment read:
3. Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957
(1965).
4. DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968).
5. See 117 Cong. Rec. H10595 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971); N.Y. Times, Nov.
14, 1971, §4, at 8, col. 1.
6. See U.S. News and World Report, Mar. 2, 1970, at 39-40.
7. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
A. 117 Cong. Rec. H10657 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
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"SECTION 1. Nothing contained in this Constitution shall abridge
the right of persons lawfully assembled, in any public building which
is supported in whole or in part through the expenditure of public
funds, to participate in nondenominational prayer.
SEC. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date
of its submission to the States by the Congress." 9
During the debate on November 8, 1971, the Wylie
Amendment was amended, by consent of its sponsors, by
changing the word "nondenominational" to "voluntary" and
adding the words "or meditation" after "prayer," making it
read:
.. to participate in voluntary prayer or meditation." 1 0
The Wylie Amendment was the latest in a long line of
proposed amendments to allow school prayers..' Considera-
tion of these amendments had previously been blocked in the
House Judiciary Committee, but Congressman Wylie obtained
the necessary 218 signatures on a discharge petition to bring
the matter to the House floor for the November 8th vote with-
out action by the Judiciary Committee.'2
Since the prayer amendment is likely to continue as a
legal and political issue, it will be useful to consider here its
purpose, effect and desirability. In Engel v. Vitale,13 the Su-
preme Court ruled in 1962 that the recitation, as part of a
public school program, of the twenty-two word New York
State Regents' Prayer, is a violation of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment even though students were
not required to participate in the recitation. The prayer read:
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,
and we beg thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers
and our country." The Court majority said, "It is neither
sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate gov-
ernment in this country should stay out of the business of
9. HJ. Res. 191, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
10. 117 Cong. Rec. 10644 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
11. See for example: 11J. Res. 693, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (intro.
duced by Rep. Frank J. Becker (R-N.Y.)) ; S.J. Res. 6, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969) (introduced by Sen. Everett M. Dirksen (R-Ill.)).
12. 117 Cong. Rec. H10592-93 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971); N.Y. Times, Nov.
9, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
13. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely
religious function to the people themselves and to those the
people choose to look to for religious guidance." 14 The Court
in Engel did not cite any cases in support of its determination.
The ruling seemed to rest on an incapacity of government,
under the First Amendment, to write or sanction "official
prayers" of any type, at least in public schools. The Court did
not spell out the reason for the incapacity, but it was indi-
cated by Justice Black, speaking for the majority:
"When the power, prestige and financial support of government is
placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pres-
sure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially
approved religion is plain."' 5
Justice Black was hinting the concept of neutrality which
was explicitly found controlling by the Court in the second
school prayer case, in 1963, where the Court forbade the use
of the Lord's Prayer and readings from the Bible as devotional
exercises in public schools.' 6 The Court ruled that the prac-
tices violated the First Amendment command that govern-
ment shall be "neutral" in matters of religion. This concept
of neutrality, wrote Mr. Justice Clark for the majority, op-
erates to prevent a situation where the "official support of
the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the
tenets of one of all orthodoxies."'17
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal
Government can constitutionally force a person to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. Neither can constitutionally pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers,
and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence
of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.' 8
The Court in Schempp formulated the following test to
measure the validity of enactments under the neutrality con-
cept of the establishment clause:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement of inhibi-
tion of religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
14. Id. at 435.
15. Id. at 431.
16. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
17. Id. at 222.
18. Id. at 220, quoting from the opinion of Justice Black for the Court in
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
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power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be
a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion.19
There have been several later decisions applying the neu-
trality mandate of the prayer decisions in such areas as gov-
ernment aid to church-related schools and government tax
exemptions for religious bodies. 20 It is beyond the scope of
this article to discuss in detail the implications of the school
prayer cases in these areas. For one thing, those implications
are far-reaching and, in some respects, complex. This article,
moreover, is concerned with the proposed constitutional
prayer amendment. The amendment, if adopted, would have
only a marginal impact, if any, on the government-aid issue.
We ought, therefore, to limit this analysis to the restricted
issue of public prayer as it is treated in the proposed amend-
ment.
The school prayer decisions were wrongly decided and
ought to be reversed by one means or another. But to under-
stand the error and the danger of those rulings, we must first
examine the content of the "neutrality" principle upon which
they were based. The First Amendment religion clauses
provide: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
.... "21 The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, pro-
vides that no State may ". . . deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law .... ,22 The
Court had held, prior to the school prayer case, that the Four-
teenth Amendment subjected the states to the restrictions
which the First Amendment had applied to the federal gov-
ernment. 23 The states thereby were forbidden by the Court,
as was Congress by the First Amendment, from making any
"law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .... ,,24 The First Amendment was
prompted by the circumstance that, in the words of James
19. Id. at 222.
20. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) ; Walz v. Tax.
Comm., 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 674 (1971);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21. U. S. CoNsT. amend. I.
22. U. S. CowsT. amend XIV.
23. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
24. U. S. CoxsT. amend. I.
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Madison during the debate in Congress over its adoption, 'the
people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two
combine together, and establish a religion to which they would
compel others to conform.",2 5 It was the purpose of the estab-
lishment clause, then, to prevent the prescription by Congress
of "a national faith," that is, a nationally established official
church.26 As Judge Thomas Cooley put it:
"By establishment of religion is meant the setting up or recognition
of a state church, or at least the conferring upon one church of special
favors and advantages which are denied others."27
It has been incorrectly asserted, by the Supreme Court
and others, that the establishment clause ordained a govern-
ment abstention from all matters of religion, a neutrality be-
tween those who believe in God and those who do not. An
examination of the history of the clause, however, will not
sustain that analysis. Its end was neutrality, but only of a
sort. It commanded impartiality on the part of government
as among the various sects of theistic religions, that is, re-
ligions that profess a belief in God. But as between theistic
religions and those nontheistic creeds that do not acknowledge
God, the precept of neutrality under the establishment clause
did not obtain. Government, under the establishment clause,
could generate an affirmative atmosphere of hospitality to-
ward theistic religion, so long as no substantial partiality was
shown toward any particular theistic sect or combination of
sects. Justice Joseph Story, who served on the Supreme Court
from 1811 to 1845 and who was a leading Unitarian, con-
firmed this historical meaning of the First Amendment:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and of the
(First) Amendment to it . . . the general if not the universal senti-
ment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement
from the state so far as was not incompatible with the private rights
of conscience and the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level
all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter
indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not uni-
versal indignation.
The real object of the amendment was not to countenance, much less
to advance, Mohammedianism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating
25. 1 ANiiALs oF CoNG. 731 (1789) (1789-1791).
26. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAw &
CoNTEmP. PRon. 3, 11-12 (1949). ....
27. T. CooLrY, PRicrkLes op CONSTiTUTnONAL LAw 224 (1898).
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Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to
prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a
hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government. 2 8
Logically, this means that for purposes of the establish-
ment clause nontheistic beliefs were not considered to be
religions. Otherwise, an affirmation by government that there
is a God would be a governmental preference, through the
assertion of the essential truth of theism, of a combination of
religious sects, i.e. those that believe in God, to the disparage-
ment of those other religions which do not profess such a
belief. On the contrary, rather than regarding theism and non-
theism as merely variant religious sects within a broadly de-
fined category of "religion," the establishment clause re-
garded theism as the common denominator of all religions,
and nontheism it considered not to be a religion at all. Gov-
ernment itself could profess a belief in God, and so long as a
practical neutrality was maintained among theistic sects, the
neutrality command of the establishment clause would not be
breached.
The establishment clause evidently was based upon a
definition of religion similar to that used by Chief Justice
Hughes in his dissenting opinion in a case involving the eligi-
bility of a pacifist for naturalization:
... The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation ... One
cannot speak of religious liberty, with proper appreciation of its essen-
tial and historic significance, without assuming the existence of a belief
in supreme allegiance to the will of God.29
Obviously, however, religion must be given a broader
definition for purposes of the free exercise clause. Believers
in nontheistic creeds, such as atheists and agnostics, should
be and are protected in the free exercise of their religion as
fully as are Baptists, Jews and Catholics. While the establish-
ment clause, properly construed, permits government to en-
courage theistic religions, provided that a practical neutrality
is maintained as among theistic creeds, the free exercise clause
forbids an interference with the exercise of their beliefs by
athiests and agnostics as sternly as it forbids an interference
with the exercise of their religion by Protestants and members
28. J. STORY, CO mENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§1874, 1877 (5th ed. 1891).
29. U.S. v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931).
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of other theistic creeds. For purposes of the free exercise
clause, therefore, "religion" includes non-theistic as well as
theistic creeds, while for purposes of the establishment clause
it includes only the theistic. It is true that in one free exercise
case in 1890, the Supreme Court defined religion in theistic
terms. The case was Davis v. Beason,30 where the Court said,
"The term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his rela-
tions to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of
reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his
will." In the Davis case, the Court held that the federal law
prohibiting polygamy was not an infringement upon the re-
ligious freedom of the defendant. But the defendant in Davis
was a theist, a member of the Mormon Church, and therefore
the case did not require a definition of the rights of non-
theists. Despite the broad language of the quoted dictum, it
is fair to say that, if the issue had been presented to it, the
Supreme Court would have accorded to atheists and agnostics
the basic right to the free exercise of their beliefs.
The vice of the school prayer decisions of 1962 and 1963
lies in their importation into the establishment clause of the
comprehensive definition of religion which is properly applied
only to the free exercise clause. This process began with the
case of Toreaso v. WatkinS, 31 in which the Court invalidated
a provision of the Constitution of Maryland requiring a state
employee to declare his belief in God. The test, said Justice
Black for the Court, unconstitutionally invaded the employee's
"freedom of belief and religion." 32 The requirement was in-
valid because "The power and authority of the State of Mary-
land thus is put on the side of one particular sort of believers
-those who are willing to say they believe in 'the existence
of God.' ,3 The Court went on to emphasize the character
of nontheistic beliefs as religions:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor a Federal Gov-
ernment can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers,
and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence
of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs. 34
30. 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
31. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
32. Id. at 496.
33. Id. at 490.
34. Id. at 495.
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Appended to the last quoted clause was a footnote speci-
fying that: "Among religions in this country which do not
teach what would commonly be considered a belief in the
existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secu-
lar Humanism and others." 35
The Court's reliance on Mr. Torcaso's "freedom of belief
and religion" leaves some doubt as to whether the decision
rests on establishment clause or free exercise clause grounds.
However, it probably did rest on the latter, and the decision
is supportable in that sense, because the free exercise clause
ought to interdict states (assuming, as the Court has held,
that the First Amendment is applied fully to the states
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment) from barring nonbelievers in God from general state
employment.
In the second school prayer case,36 in 1963, however, the
Supreme Court imported the broad Torcaso definition of
religion into the establishment clause by quoting as a basis
for its decision the excerpt just quoted above from the text
of the Torcaso decision. In the mind of the Court, then, gov-
ernment is required by the establishment clause to maintain
neutrality as between two great classes or religions: the
theistic and the non-theistic. The theistic are those that pro-
fess a belief in God, however they variously regard Him. The
non-theistic creeds, whether Ethical Culture, Secular Human-
ism or whatever, do not affirm a belief in the existence of
God. It is reasonable also to include unorganized atheism and
agnosticism within the Torcaso definition of non-theistic re-
ligion. While atheism flatly rejects a belief in the existence
of God, agnosticism is:
"the doctrine that the existence or nature of any ultimate reality is
unknown and probably unknowable or that any knowledge about
matters of ultimate concern is impossible or improbable; specif: the
doctrine that God or any first cause is unknown and probably un-
knowable."37
Atheism and agnosticism are as much entitled to constitu-
tional treatment as religions as are Ethical Culture and Sec-
ular Humanism.
35. Id., n. 11.
36. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 220 (1963).
37. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged ed. 1965).
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The fallacy of the Supreme Court's "neutrality" concept
is that it is impossible for the government to maintain neu-
trality as between theistic and non-theistic religions without
implicitly establishing an agnostic position. Agnosticism, how-
ever, is a non-theistic belief. The choice, then, is not, as the
Court and its apologists have said, between "neutrality" and
government encouragement of theism. The choice is between
government encouragement of theism and government en-
couragement of agnosticism. This reality is spelled out clearly
in Justice William Brennan's seventy-four page concurring
opinion in the 1963 Schempp case. Justice Brennan probed
the deeper meaning of the Court's ruling and tried there to
demonstrate that the decision was not a precursor of further
extreme rulings. The words "under God" in the pledge of al-
legiance, for example, are not necessarily unconstitutional,
according to Brennan, because "The reference to divinity in
the revised pledge of allegiance, for example, may merely
recognize the historical fact that our Nation was believed
to have been founded 'under God.' "38
The pledge, in Justice Brennan's view, is merely one of
. the various patriotic exercises and activities used in
the public schools and elsewhere which, whatever may have
been their origins, no longer have a religious purpose or mean-
ing." 30 Justice Brennan has correctly analyzed the school
prayer decisions and he has supplied the test by which the
Supreme Court evidently wants us to decide if an exercise is
"religious" and therefore dangerous or merely a harmless
"patriotic or ceremonial" one. If the affirmation of the exis-
tence of God is to be taken seriously, it is therefore at least
in part a "religious exercise," and as such it is prohibited by
the First Amendment. Only if it is a mere affirmation of the
historical fact that the founders believed in the overlordship
of God, or that some Americans now so believe, and only if it
scrupulously avoids any affirmation of the truth or falsity
of that belief in God, can the observance be insulated from
constitutional attack.
This rationale necessarily would prevent an affirmation
by a teacher or other government official, that, in fact, the
Declaration of Independence is true when it asserts that men
38. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (1963).
39. 374 U.S. at 303-04.
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are endowed "by their Creator" with unalienable rights or
when it asserts the existence of "the laws of nature and of
nature's God," a "Supreme Judge of the world" and "Divine
Providence."
In the nature of things, governmental neutrality on the
question of God's existence is unattainable. A governmental
assertion that God does in fact exist is a preferential affirma-
tion of the truth of theism. An assertion that God does not
exist is a preference of atheism. And a perpetual suspension
of judgment by government on the question is an adoption of
the agnostic, non-theistic position through the implicit asser-
tion that, as a matter of state policy, the existence of God is
unknown or unknowable. In the school prayer cases, the Court
appears to have adopted an agnostic approach which is in-
compatible, in its treatment of the basic question of God's
existence, with the basic theistic affirmation which was
theretofore embedded in our law and tradition.
It was clearly not a purpose of the establishment clause
to forbid such a profession by government of the truth of
theism, or to forbid all official governmental sanction of
public prayer. This is shown by the fact that on September
25, 1789, the day after it approved the First Amendment,
Congress called on the President to proclaim a national day
of thanksgiving and prayer, in the following resolution:
That a joint committee of both Houses be directed to wait upon the
President of the United States to request that he would recommend
to the people of the United States a day of public thanksgiving and
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the
many signal favors of Almighty God, especially by affording them an
opportunity peaceably to establish a Constitution of government for
their safety and happiness. 4
0
President Washington issued the thanksgiving proclama-
tion on October 3, 1789, and every President, except Thomas
Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, has followed suit. Would it
not have been extraordinary for Congress to request a public
day of prayer to be observed by "the people of the United
States" and on the very same day to propose a constitutional
amendment to prohibit that very type of prayer? In fact, the
religious objection was raised by Representative Thomas
Tucker of South Carolina in the debate preceding the adop-
40. Annals of Cong. 914 (1789) (1789-1791).
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tion of the resolution. Mr. Tucker objected that calling on the
President to proclaim a day of prayer "is a business with
which Congress have nothing to do; it is a religious matter,
and as such, is proscribed to us." 41 Congress, however, passed
the resolution. If the question of Congress' competence in
religious matters had not been raised, it could possibly be
said that it had never occurred to the members, and therefore
the action of Congress ought not to be conclusive on the point.
When, however, the issue was squarely joined, the First Con-
gress deliberately overrode the same objections that are voiced
today and voted to offer public prayer to God. Numerous
other examples of the meaning of the First Amendment in
this respect are readily available to prove the point.42
The school prayer decisions, then, contradict the original
understanding of the First Amendment, as well as prohibiting
the generally accepted practice of the people. On the practical
level, they have been harmful in their effect. They unduly
infringe upon the right to the free exercise of religion, they
implicitly establish a public religion of agnosticism and they
prevent the American people, in their public functions, from
affirming as a fact that there is a divine standard of right
and wrong higher than the state.
The possible remedies for the decisions, however, are
limited. Essentially there are two: a constitutional amend-
ment and a withdrawal by Congress of the Court's appellate
jurisdiction over the subject of public prayer. The Constitu-
tion, in defining powers of the Supreme Court, provides:
In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction. In all other Cases . . . , the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress
shall make.4 3
Under this section, Congress has the power to prohibit
the Court from hearing appeals in specific areas. A simple
Act of Congress, requiring a majority vote, or two-thirds in
the event of a presidential veto, would be sufficient for this
purpose. In one celebrated case, Ex pacrte McCardle,4 4 Con-
41. Annals of Cong. 915 (1789) (1789-1791).
42. See C. Rice, The Supreme Court and Public Prayer chaps. 2-3 (1964).
43. U. S. CoNsT. art. III, §2.
44. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
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gress withdrew the appellate jurisdiction of the Court over a
Reconstruction Act case after the Court had already heard
the arguments of counsel and while the Court was formulating
its decision. Obeying the Congressional mandate, the Court
promptly dismissed the appeal.
Presumably, the Supreme Court today would follow the
McCardle precedent in the event of a withdrawal by Congress
of part of its appellate jurisdiction, at least to the extent that
the withdrawal did not interfere with cases pending at the
time of the withdrawal. 45
However, submission by the Court to Congress in this
regard cannot be foretold with certainty.46 Needless to say,
a refusal by the Court to accede to a limitation by Congress
of its appellate jurisdiction would precipitate a constitutional
crisis.
It is not the purpose of this article to examine in detail
the feasibility and effect of a withdrawal of the Court's juris-
diction. The precise meaning and effect of such a withdrawal
merit extended consideration. For instance, the question
of the extent to which state courts and lower federal
courts would consider themselves bound by the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction is worthy of study and consid-
eration as an alternative or supplementary remedy for the
prayer decisions.47
In any event, it is a matter of urgency to press for the
adoption of a prayer amendment. A constitutional amendment
can be adopted in two ways. It can be initiated by a two-thirds
majority in the House of Representatives and Senate, in which
case it must then be approved by three-fourths of the state-
legislatures. The second method is that, "on the application
of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several states," the
Congress "shall call a Convention for proposing Amend-
ments," which shall be valid upon ratification thereafter by
the legislatures or conventions, as Congress may prescribe,
45. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 567-68 (1962) ; U.S. v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 519 (1872).
46. See the statement by Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in.
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605, n. 11 (1962):
There is a serious question whether the McCardle case could com-
mand a majority view today.
47. See Manion, Cancer in the Co.titution (1972).
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in three-fourths of the states.48 The President cannot veto a
constitutional amendment and his approval is not required.
The amending process is a matter for the Congress and the
states.
It is one thing to talk about a constitutional amendment
and another to draft one. It is difficult to draft any law that
cannot be misconstrued by the courts. This possibility of mis-
interpretation is particularly important in the drafting of an
amendment which would ultimately go for interpretation to
the same Supreme Court which occasioned the amendment by
its misconstructions in the first place. A new amendment,
moreover, ideally should be broad enough to cover all those
government-sponsored religious observances which have been
drawn into question by the school prayer decisions to date.
The operative language of the Wylie amendment, as
amended on the House floor on November 8, 1971, is as
follows:
"Nothing contained in this Constitution shall abridge the right of
persons lawfully assembled, in any public building which is supported
in whole or in part through the expenditure of public funds, to par-
ticipate in voluntary prayer or meditation."49
The main thrust of the amendment is to protect the free
exercise rights of students and other citizens who desire to
acknowledge God in the same way that Congressmen do, and
this free exercise point is crucial. Under the Supreme Court's
rulings, Americans are forbidden to affirm as a fact, in school
or other public activities, that the Declaration of Indepen-
dence is true when it says there is a God and that we receive
our rights from Him and not from the state. This point is too
often overlooked. The prayer amendment is needed to permit
the American People to affirm in their public functions, that
in fact there is a standard of right and wrong higher than
the state. When that fact is obscured, particularly in the edu-
cation of the young, citizens come to regard the rights of
others and eventually even their own rights as gifts of the
state or of a voting majority. Implicitly ingrained is the belief
that the power of the state or of the majority is limited by
no higher, external standard, because even the Constitution
can be amended, whether formally or by judicial assumption
48. U. S. CoNsT. art. V.
49. 117 Cong. Rec. H10644 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
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of the amending power. Ultimately, a major safeguard against
legalized oppression is a widespread public conviction, espe-
cially among the young, that unalienable rights come from
God and that some things, such as the murder of innocent
babies, are unjust because they violate "the laws of nature
and of nature's God," no matter with what forms of legal
correctness they are enacted.
There are more specific questions, however, raised by
the language of the Wylie Amendment. It will be useful to
answer them in series:
1. QUESTION: Who is to determine whether a prayer will be said and if
so, what will be its content?
ANSWER: The local school authorities would determine this. In the
usual case, this would be the elected local school board.
The school board would have the power to delegate the
task of composition or selection to a principal or teacher
or, for that matter, a student, subject to judicial review
which should be exercised in the event the authorities
clearly abuse their discretion. The United States Constitu-
tion is premised in its division of powers upon the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, that governmental functions are best
entrusted to the lowest level of government able to ac-
complish them. To be sure, there are powers that are denied
therein to any government, state or federal, such as the
right to deprive a person of life, liberty or property with-
out "due process of law." But the issue of school prayer
is one which, prior to the Supreme Court prayer decisions
in 1962 and 1963, was safely left to the good sense of the
people in the localities involved. It is not the sort of issue
which requires a uniform national solution. Diversity here
will be advantageous, and judicial remedies will continue
to be available to prevent abuse.
2. QUESTION: Assuming a school elects to have a prayer, is it to be given
during the regular school hours?
ANSWER: It would be lawful under the amendment, for the school au-
thorities to provide for the recitation of a prayer during
school hours. Of course, it would be proper for the courts to
intervene to prevent abuse, for example, if the practice were
carried out in such a way and at such frequency and length
as to interfere with the educational function of the school.
Of course, too, the ordinary practice of opening the School
Day with a prayer, or of otherwise including prayer as an
incidental part of the school day, would not constitute such
an abuse.
3. QUESTION: Who in the school will give the prayer?
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ANSWER: This, too, should properly be left to the judgment of the
local school authorities, subject to judicial review in cases
of abuse. Clearly, no person could be compelled to give
the prayer or otherwise participate. The person giving the
prayer should be a volunteer from among the faculty, ad-
ministration or student body of the school.
4. QUESTION: May it be given out loud or silently?
ANSWER:
5. QUESTION:
This should be left to the judgment of the local school
authorities.
When are persons not "lawfully assembled" under the
amendment?
ANSWER: Trespassers or disorderly persons would evidently not be
"lawfully assembled." School children, members of a city
council, participants at a public meeting and persons law-
fully present at other lawful gatherings in public buildings
would be included.
6. QUESTION: If the prayer is to be used in the classroom, and is volun-
tary or non-compulsory as far as the pupil is concerned,
does the teacher have the same right as the pupil in this
regard?
ANSWER: Yes. It would violate the teacher's right to the free exer-
cise of his religion if he were compelled to participate.
7. QUESTION:
ANSWER:
If the prayer is voluntary, how is a dissenting pupil or
teacher to respond while the prayer is being offered?
The teacher or pupil who chooses not to participate would
be free to remain or to leave the room. Compulsion to
participate would be forbidden, and judicial relief would
be available in appropriate cases. However, the fact that
a decision not to participate may result in some embarrass-
ment to the non-participant would not be a sufficient reason
to prohibit others from participating in the prayer. Also,
there is a strong educational advantage to be attained by
school prayer. Dean Erwin N. Griswold, now the Solicitor
General of the United States, is a critic of the school prayer
decisions, although he does not favor the constitutional
amendment method of reversing them. Dean Griswold de-
scribed the advantages of school prayer in an article in
1963:
Let us consider the Jewish child, or the Catholic child,
or the nonbeliever, or the Congregationalist, or the
Quaker. He, either alone, or with a few or many others
of his views, attends a public school, whose School Dis-
trict, by local action, has prescribed the Regents' Prayer.
When the prayer is recited, if this child or his parents
feel that he cannot participate, he may stand or sit, in
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respectful attention, while the other children take part
in the ceremony. Or he may leave the room. It is said
that this is bad, because it sets him apart from the other
children. It is even said that there is an element of
compulsion in this-what the Supreme Court has called
an "indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities
to conform." But is this the way it should be looked at?
The child of a nonconforming or minority group is,
to be sure, different in his beliefs. That is what it means
to be a member of a minority. Is it not desirable ...
that, at the same time, he experiences and learns the
fact that his difference is tolerated and accepted? No
compulsion is put upon him. He need not participate.
But he, too, has the opportunity to be tolerant.
He allows the majority of the group to follow their own
tradition, perhaps coming to understand and to respect
what they feel is significant to them.
Is this not a useful and valuable and educational and,
indeed, a spiritual experience for the children of what
I have called the majority group? They experience the
values of their own culture; but they also see that there
are others who do not accept those values, and that they
are wholly tolerated in their nonacceptance. Learning
tolerance for other persons, no matter how different,
and respect for their beliefs, may be an important part
of American education, and wholly consistent with the
First Amendment. I hazard the thought that no one
would think otherwise were it not for parents who take
an absolutist approach to the problem, perhaps encour-
aged by the absolutist expressions of Justices of the
Supreme Court, on and off the bench.50
8. QUESTION: If the right to pray is an inalienable right and government
may not constitutionally prohibit prayer, will not all those
who are lawfully assembled in a public building be denied
their constitutional right if the appropriate public body has
not decided upon a nondenominational prayer?
ANSWER: The basic right involved here is the individual right to
the free exercise of religion. It would be the duty of the
public body or officials involved to give due and reasonable
recognition to that right. However, it still would be appro-
priate for that public body or those officials to conclude
in a given case that the inclusion of prayer would interfere
with the primary purpose of the assembly concerned. This
decision would have to be based on reasonable grounds and
it would be subject to judicial review to prevent serious
abuse.
50. Griswold, Absolute Is In the Dark, 8 Utah L.Rev. 167-177 (1963).
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9. QUESTION: If a public body was unable to determine what was a non-
denominational prayer, or if a dissatisfied citizen disagreed
with the decision, would this type of action be appealable
to the federal courts?
ANSWER: The federal and state courts would have jurisdiction to
prevent serious abuse here. The amendment does not in any
way limit access to the courts for constitutional relief.
10. QUESTION: What is the advantage of the words, "or meditation"?
ANSWER: The purpose of the amendment is to restore the Constitu-
tion to the meaning it had before the Supreme Court dis-
torted it. Under that meaning, the people in their communi-
ties, acting through their elected school officials, had the
choice of providing prayer, meditation, or nothing, to open
the school day. That system worked well and served to im-
press upon the rising generation the fact that God and not
the state is the giver of rights. The system operated by
consensus and it contributed to mutual understanding. The
words, "or meditation" are especially useful in that they
provide an alternative option that may more accurately
reflect the desires and preferences of the local community.
The prayer amendment is worthy of support. It is sound
in itself. And the campaign for the amendment reminds us all
of the reality that this nation is indeed "under God". The
school prayer decisions require this nation, in its public activ-
ity, to close its eyes to that reality. They ought to be reversed.
We can rightly say with respect to them what Abraham Lin-
coln said of the Dred Scott case, where the Supreme Court
held that a Negro could not be a citizen of the United States:
"I believe the decision was improperly made, and I go for reversing
it." l,
51. 4 The Words of Abraham Lincoln 215 (Fed. ed. 1905).
